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Abstract: A Safety Maturity Model was developed for use in UK coal mining operations 
in order to assess the level of compliance and effectiveness with a recently introduced 
standards based safety management system. The developed model allowed for a  
“self-assessment” of the maturity to be undertaken by teams from the individual sites. 
Assessments were undertaken at all sites (surface and underground) and in some cases 
within each site (e.g., underground operations, surface coal preparation plant). Once the 
level of maturity was established, improvement plans were developed to improve the 
maturity of individual standards that were weaker than the average and/or improve the 
maturity as a whole. The model was likened to a journey as there was a strong focus on 
continual improvement and effectiveness of the standards, rather than pure compliance. 
The model has been found to be a practical and useful tool by sites as a means of 
identifying strengths and weaknesses within their systems, and as a means of assurance 
with the safety management system standards. 
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1. Introduction 
The maturity model concept is a recent research innovation within the discipline of safety 
management and has been applied to safety culture development within a number of “high hazard” 
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industries such as the offshore [1,2], aviation [3], rail [4,5] and petro-chemical industries [6,7]. These 
models originated from both quality and organizational development models as well as capability 
maturity models that had been used in the software industry [7]. Such models were developed to allow 
organizations to understand their own level of safety culture maturity by assessing the level of 
compliance with various key elements of safety culture across a number of stages (typically 5) that 
represent different levels of maturity. 
Industries where these models are well established, such as the oil and gas industry, are currently 
putting a considerable amount of effort into establishing best practice and identifying tools and 
techniques that are proven to be effective in improving safety [1]. Whilst this approach is sensible, its 
effectiveness may be limited by differences in the safety culture across and within the industry, and 
those companies/sites in the early stages of developing their culture will require different techniques 
that those with stronger cultures. Safety maturity models, which can be applied on a company by 
company, or site by site basis, can identify these differences and then help address any behavioral and 
cultural issues they may have with a view to improving the safety culture maturity over time. 
2. Safety Maturity Models 
An example of a safety maturity model is given by Fleming and Lardner [8] who show a three stage 
model developed by an offshore operating company. The three stages of safety culture in this model 
are (i) dependent, (ii) independent and (iii) interdependent. In a “dependent culture” there is an 
emphasis on management and supervisory control, with a heavy focus on written rules and procedures. 
Their study [8] states that if an organization with such a culture wants to improve its maturity it needs 
to develop an “independent culture” where the focus is on a personal commitment to and responsibility 
for safety. Whilst there will still be rules and standards, employees look after their own safety. The 
final stage is “interdependent” where there is a team commitment to safety with everyone having a 
sense of responsibility for safety beyond their own work and by caring for the safety of others. In this 
model, the drivers of the safety culture improvement process are teamwork, trust and the ownership of 
safety by the workforce. The same stages and drivers are defined by DuPont’s “Bradley Curve”. 
Two of the more common cited maturity models are those subsequently developed by Fleming [1,6] 
and that of Hudson [2,9,10]. Fleming’s model [1] looks at the level of maturity across 10 elements of 
safety culture adapted from those listed by the UK Health and Safety Executive in their human error 
guidance, HSG48 [11] namely: 
• Management commitment and visibility; 
• Communications; 
• Production versus Safety; 
• Learning organization; 
• Safety resources; 
• Participation; 
• Shaded perceptions about safety; 
• Trust; 
• Individual relations and job satisfaction. 
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The five levels of maturity are set out as a number of iterative stages that an organisation can move 
through. These stages of maturity are (i) Emerging, (ii) Managing, (iii) Involving, (iv) Co-operating 
and (v) Continually Improving; and the model provides a framework to assist in the selection and 
implementation of appropriate behavioral interventions. The overall level of safety culture maturity is 
determined by taking a mean of the level of maturity at each of these individual ten elements. The 
model suggests that a stage by stage approach in improving safety culture is required and that skipping 
a stage in the sequence is difficult [1]. It is likely that a site will spend some time, perhaps years, 
successfully progressing from one stage to the next. This safety culture improvement process is 
undertaken by sites assessing their current level of maturity and then by developing and implementing 
a plan to move to the next level based on removing the weaknesses of the previous level [12]. The 
implementation of this plan is monitored and the level of maturity re-assessed to evaluate success and 
any further actions. 
The maturity refers to the maturity of the organization’s behaviors and not the maturity of the safety 
management systems. Therefore Fleming [1] also states that his model is only really of relevance to 
organizations where the technical and systems aspects of safety are performing adequately and the 
majority of accidents that occur appear to be due to behavioral or cultural factors. Lardner [6] gives a 
case study of the use of this model at a large petrochemical plant in the UK where the maturity of most 
of the individual safety culture elements were at level 3 (Involving) moving to level 4 (Co-operating) 
indicating a mature culture but wary of some differences in culture across different occupational groups. 
Hudson’s Model [2,9,10] has been used to describe the safety maturity in many industries including 
oil, aviation and healthcare. Hudson’s model illustrates a five step progression from a “pathological” 
stage where there is a “no care” culture and “no systems” through to a “generative” stage where 
managing risks is a way of life and fully integrated systems are effectively in place. The descriptions 
of each stage of safety culture are given below [7,9]. 
• Pathological—Safety is a problem caused by workers. The main drivers are the business and a 
desire not to get caught by the regulator. 
• Reactive—Organisations start to take safety seriously but there is only action after incidents. 
• Calculative—Safety is driven by management systems, with much collection of data. Safety is 
still primarily driven by management and imposed rather than looked for by the workforce. 
• Proactive—With improved performance, the unexpected is a challenge. Workforce involvement 
starts to move the initiative away from a purely top down approach. 
• Generative—There is active participation at all levels. Safety is perceived to be an inherent part 
of the business. Organisations are characterised by chronic unease as a counter to complacency. 
Parker et al. [10] developed a framework consisting of 18 elements, and developed a question set 
relating to each element and each maturity level. This gave rise to a tool that could be used by 
organizations to understand their safety culture maturity. These eighteen elements were classed as 
either concrete elements [i.e., relating to the safety management system (11 elements in total)] or 
abstract elements [i.e., relating to the attitudes and behaviors (7 elements in total)]. Therefore this 
model could be applied to organizations with weaker safety management systems unlike Flemings’ 
model [1]. The eighteen elements used are given in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Elements of safety culture within Hudson maturity model [10]. 
“Concrete” Elements “Abstract” Elements 
Benchmarking, Trends & Statistics 
Audits & Reviews 
Incident/Accident Reporting, Investigation & Analysis; 
Hazard and Unsafe Act reports 
Work planning including PTW, Journey Management 
Contractor Management 
Competency/Training 
Work-site Job Safety Techniques 
Who Checks Safety on a day to day basis? 
What is size & status of the HSE Department? 
What are the rewards of good safety performance? 
Who causes accidents in the eyes of management? 
What happens after an accident? Is the feedback Loop 
being closed? 
How do safety meetings feel? 
Balance between HSE & Profitability? 
Is management interested in communicating HSE issues 
with the workforce? 
Commitment level of the workforce and level of care 
for colleagues. 
What is the purpose of procedures? 
3. The Use of Safety Maturity Models in the Mining Industry 
Within the mining industry there are many differences in safety culture and the state of safety 
management across operations which will limit the effectiveness of best practice tools and techniques 
that companies are trying to introduce. Like the oil industry, sites at the early stages of safety maturity 
will require different techniques that those with stronger maturities. Mining is therefore well suited to 
the use of maturity models and indeed, some have been developed and used. 
A team from the University of Queensland developed the MIRM (Minerals Industry Risk 
Management) Maturity Chart that was based on both the Hudson model and a similar approach used 
by Bayside Aluminum, a BHP Billiton site in Richards Bay, South Africa [13–15]. The MIRM model 
is described as a ladder that has five stages or “rungs”. The terms used are slightly different from those 
used by Hudson [2,9] although the implied levels of maturity are similar. The lowest rung is called 
“Vulnerable” where the site will “accept that accidents happen”. The next rung or level of 
improvement sees the site move to “Reactive” where there is recognition that the site should “prevent a 
similar incident”. Improvement from this rung moves the site to “Compliant” where the culture and 
systems try to “prevent incidents before they occur”. The next rung in the ladder is probably the largest 
or most profound step for any site. Movement to the “Proactive” rung involves the site, through its 
culture and methods, embracing the systems approach. At this rung of the ladder the system ownership 
genuinely moves to line management and supervision. The final rung in the MIRM ladder is titled 
“Resilient” which is used to describe a site that has successfully integrated safety and risk management 
into its operations. The rungs are shown in Figure 1, along with the specific characteristics expected at 
each stage. 
The MIRM ladder was not written as a guideline but rather a description of a journey that is 
intended to fit any minerals industry site. It has been provided to assist sites with identifying their 
current status on this journey and potential next steps for improvement. Like the Hudson model there is 
a clear distinction between the cultural elements and the system elements. 
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Figure 1. MIRM maturity chart [15]. 
 Minerals Industry Risk Management (MIRM) Maturity Chart 
• No care culture 
• Apathy/resistance 
• Near misses not 
considered 
• Negligence 
• Dishonesty 
• Hiding of incidents 
• No or little training 
• Poor or no 
communication 
• Reactive approach 
• No systems 
• No risk assessment 
• Legal non compliance 
• Accept equipment / 
process decay 
• Superficial incident 
investigation 
• Poor investigation 
• No monitoring/audits 
• Permit non-compliance 
• Potential illegal practices 
• Blame culture 
• Accept need to care 
• Some near miss 
reporting 
• Some window dressing 
e.g. pre-inspection 
cleanups and light duty 
• Disciplinary action 
• Minimum / inconsistent 
training 
• Some communication on a 
need to know basis 
• Administrator driven 
• Loose systems, elements of a 
HS Management System 
• Re-active risk 
assessment 
• Minimum legal compliance 
• Apply PPE as a way of 
eliminating exposure 
• Incident investigation 
but limited analysis 
• Focus on what 
happened 
• No systems focus 
• Human fault focus 
• Ad hoc monitoring/ 
audits 
• No occupational hygiene or 
health initiatives 
• Reactive medical monitoring 
• Monitoring as per regulations 
• Compliance culture 
• Some participation 
• Near miss discussions 
• Acceptable 
training/awareness 
• Established and good 
communication channels 
• Regular people involvement 
and focus 
• OH&S Coord. driven 
• OH&S stds system and ISO 
9002 or equivalent 
• Risk assessment through 
existing systems 
• Total legal compliance 
• Strictly enforce the use of PPE 
where required (knowing risk) 
• Causal incident analysis 
based on event potential 
• Info sharing from events 
• Planned occupational hygiene 
/ environmental monitoring 
• Periodical medical 
examinations 
• Planned 
monitoring/audits 
• Safety meetings & talks 
• Some task observations 
• Ownership culture 
• Involvement at all levels 
• Near miss involvement 
• High level of 
training/awareness 
• Communication at a high level 
hiding nothing 
• Line driven systems 
improvement 
• ISO 14001 and OHSAS 18000 
or equivalent 
• Pro-active formal risk 
assmt 
• Beyond legal compliance 
• Seek to actively engineer out 
process/equipment 
inadequacies 
• Incident learnings shared 
with all levels 
• Well designed plans/procedures 
• Focus on adhering to site 
plans and procedures 
• Integrated audits 
• Peer evaluation and discussion 
• Individually internalised 
• Integrated management 
systems 
• Risk assessment 
integrated into all 
systems 
• Self regulating style 
• Eliminate problems 
before they occur 
• All threats considered in 
decision-making 
• Systems 
enhancement 
through external 
evaluation / auditing 
• Way of life 
• Comes natural 
• Personal 
involvement by all 
to prevent 
incidents 
• Complete understanding 
• All informed at all times 
about everything 
Accept that incidents 
happen 
Prevent a similar incident 
Prevent incidents before 
they occur 
Improve the  
systems 
Way we do business 
Reactive 
Vulnerable 
Compliant 
Proactive 
Resilient 
 
In 2007, Anglo American plc embarked on a major new in-house initiative in order to revitalize and 
strengthen the companies approach to safety risk management and a major training programme was 
developed that was delivered to all their Managers worldwide [11,16]. As part of this training, the risk 
management process was explained and discussed as a “journey” based on the MIRM safety ladder that 
involves both people and systems [16]. Figure 2 shows their model depicted as an image of a spiral 
staircase that is used in all courses, with discussions and exercises to identify current status and plans 
to improve. Here assessments are made against 23 elements (6 people elements and 17 system elements). 
As part of this roll-out, all management teams have undertaken an assessment of where they are on 
the “safety journey” and plans have been developed for improvement that have been integrated into 
their operations. 
It is important to note that these models are not just about assessing safety culture on its own. The 
Anglo Model, MIRM Ladder and Hudson Model all suggest a strong relationship between the culture 
of an organization and the development of a systems approach. It is critical to recognize that systems 
cannot progress up the ladder without culture progressing in parallel and vice versa. Gordon et al. [3] 
states that if there is a safety management system but no real commitment or culture towards safety, 
then the management system will not be effective, as decisions will not prioritise safety. Similarly, if 
there is a good safety culture, but no management system, then the way that safety is organized may be 
inconsistent, under-resourced and not seen as business driven [3]. It is possible that systems effectiveness 
issues that are currently experienced at mines sites are a result of such a culture/systems mismatch. 
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Figure 2. Anglo American Plc maturity model [16]. 
 
4. Development of a Safety Maturity Model for UK Coal 
4.1. The UK Coal Safety Way 
By global standards UK Coal plc is a small mining company that took over many of the operating 
surface and deep mines when the UK coal industry was privatized in 1995. Although at the time of 
privatization it operated 20 deep mines and 27 surface mines in the UK, there has been a gradual 
reduction over the last 16 years to a point where it currently operates 3 deep mines and 6 surface 
mines. UK Coal remains the largest indigenous producer of coal in the UK, supplying approximately 
5% of the total country’s energy needs for electricity generation [17]. 
Although the mining industry in the UK is largely in decline, what has become increasingly obvious 
was the overall safety performance within the sector which appeared to be on a worsening trend. This 
period saw UK Coal’s safety performance dip, from a period of almost seven years without a fatal 
accident, to a position where there were seven fatal accidents in deep mines between 2006 and 2009. 
This was accompanied by an increase in the level of significant incidents. In 2009 decisions were made 
to start and address the decline in safety performance, and in 2010 a new safety management system 
was introduced. This drew on best practices from other major mining companies, and other heavy 
industry. The revised management system was designed consisting of twelve standards (see Figure 3). 
Within each of the twelve elements a series of requirements had been formulated which needed to be 
adopted by all sites. 
Whilst it was necessary to assess compliance against those standards, it was felt that any means of 
assurance should not just measure pure compliance as a “yes” or “no”. It was necessary to incorporate 
a process that would give individual sites and departments targeted development areas to drive a 
continuous safety improvement down throughout the organization above and beyond pure compliance. 
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It was felt that a “maturity model” approach would best suit this as it would highlight strong and weak 
areas and by considering it as a “journey”, it would allow for continual improvement. 
Figure 3. The UK Coal safety management system. 
 
4.2. Development of the Methodology 
It was decided to develop and use such a maturity model to measure progress in the integration of 
the safety management system standards at sites. Here, the “systems” and “culture” elements, that were 
separate in the Hudson, MIRM and Anglo American models, would be integrated within each of the 12 
standards, which is unlike any of the safety maturity models described so far. The Maturity Model, 
which was named the UK Coal Journey Model, is shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. UK Coal journey model. 
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The model was developed so that the bottom level has few or no standards in place, and as a site 
moves up thorough the five levels they should start to see more of the requirements of the standards in 
place and there is improved compliance with, and effectiveness of these standards. There is also 
increased ownership of the standards by Manager, Supervisors and Operators. It should be noted that 
when examining the measurement system it was important that this could be applied at various levels 
within the organization. It was also important that there was not a sole reliance on the views of 
Management, but the process was also able to capture the Workforce views when forming a picture. This 
would come down to the way the model was applied at sites through team based “self-assessments”. 
When developing the model it was also felt that it was important to recognize that different sites 
will invariably be at different places on the UK Coal Journey Model, and it was equally possible that 
the same sites may be stronger in some of the areas covered by the standards than others. Therefore 
one of the significant differences here is that the steps are seen as overlapping on the model. 
The model was designed not to be an audit tool as such, but to take each standard, and look at how 
each standard is implemented and what occurs in practice. A self-assessment question set was developed 
to allow sites to determine their level of maturity (or how far they are “on the journey”) by making 
observations for each standard at each of the 5 levels. From this, sites can look at what areas they need 
to improve, and then put together a specific action plan to help them move up a level. 
As the model was starting to be developed it became very apparent following consultation with the 
senior management team with that the questions needed to be wide ranging in order to achieve the 
overall aim of each standard. As a result it was not possible to put together one description or one 
question per standard. To ensure that all of the implied requirements were met some standards in the 
model had to have up to four individual descriptions/question sets. The total number of 
questions/descriptions and their related subjects are shown in Table 2. 
A separate “journey improvement” section was also documented, listing suggested actions and 
initiatives that could be undertaken for each element moving up each of the four stages (“Basic” to 
“Reactive”, “Reactive” to “Planned”, “Planned” to “Proactive”, “Proactive” to “Resilient”). This was 
so that each Site could identify actions that they could implement, based on their findings, to move 
them up a level of maturity, or to move elements that were perhaps lower than the average, up to the 
average maturity level. As with any maturity model it is not possible for an organization to jump or 
skip a level, and also to realize that moving up a level can take some considerable time. 
Table 2. UK Coal maturity model question set. 
UK Coal Safety Way Element Question Set 
1. Leadership & Accountability 1. Safety Leadership & Commitment 
2. Safety Management Adoption 
3. Rewards of Good Safety Performance 
4. Work Planning 
2. Policy & Commitment 1. Safety Accountability 
2. Safety vs. Production 
3. Safety Responsibilities 
4. Size & Status of Safety Department 
3. Risk & Change Management 1. Major Hazard Risk Management 
2. Work Site JSA 
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Table 2. Cont. 
UK Coal Safety Way Element Question Set 
4. Legal Requirements 1. Awareness of Legal Requirements 
5. Objectives, Targets & Performance Measurement 1. Setting of Targets 
2. Monitoring & Accountability 
6. Training, Competence & Awareness 1. Training & Competency 
2. Assessment of Training 
7. Communication & Consultation 1. Communications 
2. Workforce Involvement & Consultation 
8. Control of Documents 1. Document Control 
9. Operational Controls 1. Jobs planning & Procedures 
2. Control Measures & Corrective Actions 
3. Maintenance 
4. Daily Inspections 
10. Emergency Procedures 1. Standard of Emergency Planning 
2. Maintaining & Monitoring Response 
11. Incident Investigation 1. Accident Investigation 
2, Quality of Investigations 
3. Follow up & Analysis 
4. Hazard & Unsafe Act Reporting 
12. Monitoring, Auditing & Reviews 1. Safety Performance Measurements 
2. Monitoring & Auditing 
4.3. Trialing the Methodology 
The descriptions and questions sets within the model were drafted and in order to test or “calibrate” 
the model an informal exercise was undertaken at one of the deep mines in January 2011. Following 
this some of the language and descriptions within the question sets were changed, but it was agreed 
that the overriding description for each element question set at each stage of maturity was accurate. 
This was then put together in a workbook so that it could be used at sites. A copy of the question set 
for Element 5 of the safety management system (Objectives, Targets and Performance Measurement) 
is shown in Table 3. This shows the two question sets relating to this standard covering (i) the setting 
of targets and (ii) monitoring and accountability. The overall requirements for this element are  
as follows. 
1. Each site shall establish a measurable safety plan, quantifying corporate objectives and targets 
and site objectives and targets which shall be agreed by site personnel and corporate personnel. 
Objectives and targets shall be in line with the general target of enabling continual 
improvement of health and safety performance. 
2. Measurement against the plan shall form part of the site and corporate safety  
accountability process. 
3. Objectives and targets shall be communicated and understood by all appropriate personnel, 
including the Executive, Senior Management, line management, employees and contractors. 
4. Adequate resources shall be assigned to ensure that the planned and agreed targets and 
objectives are met. 
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5. Senior management shall be issued with Safety Performance Indicators. Safety performance 
shall be part of those indicators to ensure that safety is a priority for management. 
6. UK Coal shall ensure that objectives and targets are reviewed on a periodic basis to ensure they 
stay on programme and to agree changes when they do not. 
7. Targets and objectives shall be both reactive—accidents, incidents and dangerous 
occurrences—and proactive—near hits, etc. and where appropriate, performance measures 
including benchmarking against established best practice. 
8. The organisation and all sites will be responsible for the effective review of objectives, targets 
and performance indicators to ensure they remain relevant for the current safety risk. 
Table 3. Example of question-set related to UK Coal safety way element 5. 
Basic Reactive Planned Proactive Resilient 
5.1. Setting of Targets 
Little evidence of safety 
related activities. Formal 
safety goals and objectives 
have not been identified, 
let alone documented. 
Safety goals are based 
around improving safety 
performance, based on 
statistics from the 
previous year. 
This is set site-wide with 
a site plan established by 
the safety department that 
is passed around the senior 
management team, but 
not well communicated 
to the rest of the 
workforce. 
Some safety targets 
related to improving 
standards or systems are 
undertaken, but actions 
for this mainly apply to 
the safety department. 
All targets are determined 
by the Safety department 
and sanctioned by Senior 
Management. 
Senior Managers are 
involved in determining 
safety objectives in 
conjunction with the 
safety department 
Every worker in the 
organization is 
accountable for specific 
risk control activities. 
Roles and activities are 
clearly defined for all 
levels in the site. 
Work teams 
independently establish 
their own work 
objectives. 
5.2. Monitoring & Accountability 
There is no accountability 
as nothing has been set. 
Accountability is weak 
and progress is rarely 
reviewed throughout the 
year but the safety 
department is held 
accountable for results. 
Monitoring is carried out 
by the Safety department 
who also becomes 
accountable for actions 
and activities related to 
the safety management 
system. 
Accountability is split 
between safety and line 
management depending 
on the results. 
Line managers and 
supervisors are held 
accountable for results. 
Safety initiatives/ 
activities are adequately 
resourced and action 
plans/ objectives are set 
and monitored. 
The safety performance 
indicators are proactive, 
and a performance 
monitoring system is in 
place focusing on 
operational excellence. 
The baseline studies at the three deep mines were undertaken in April 2011. There was some 
variation in the makeup of teams at sites with one site’s management team initially undertaking the 
exercise, and at other sites teams consisting of managers, supervisors and operators were brought 
together. In some cases teams were formed that represented individual parts of the mine (such as the 
coal preparation plant and the production face). 
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The results from each of the exercises were collated and presented on a “spider diagram”. Figure 5 
shows two such diagrams from one of the mines (Mine A). Where there were differences in maturity 
noted within elements for different questions, a mean position was taken for the purpose of the 
diagram. In the diagram the acronyms S1 to S12 represent the 12 elements of the management system 
as listed in Table 2. Figure 5a shows the results of the original assessment undertaken by the 
Management Team at Mine A, and Figure 5b shows the combined results for a series of later studies 
undertaken by groups with Management, Supervisors and Operators within the same mine. 
Figure 5. Spider diagram of results from Mine A. 
(a) (b) 
It can be immediately seen that there is close mapping between the two in terms of weaker and 
stronger areas despite the studies being undertaken separately at different times and by different 
people. It can also be seen that there were no elements that were deemed to be resilient (the outer layer 
in the diagram). Elements 3, 5 and 8–12 were found to be at the “Lower Proactive” level with the 
remainder in the “Planned” level. This showed that the “doing” and “checking” part of the 
management system were strong, and that other elements (such as, 1. Leadership/Accountability and 2. 
Policy/Commitment) were weaker. 
In terms of across the three deep mines as a whole, Table 4 shows the percentage of responses for 
each of the Management system elements across the five levels of maturity for the initial studies at the 
three sites (A, B and C). 
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Table 4. Analysis of results from the deep mines. 
Element Basic Reactive Planned Proactive Resilient
1. Leadership & Accountability - 8% 50% 38% 4% 
2. Policy & Commitment - 8% 50% 42% - 
3. Risk & Change Management - - 33% 42% 25% 
4. Legal Requirements - 33% 50% 17% - 
5. Objectives & Perf Measurement - - 58% 42% - 
6. Training, Competence & Awareness - - 75% 17% 8% 
7. Communication & Consultation - - 42% 58% - 
8. Control of Documents - - 17% 83% - 
9. Operational Controls - - 33% 63% 4% 
10. Emergency Procedures - - 17% 58% 25% 
11. Incident Investigation - - 50% 37% 13% 
12. Monitoring, Auditing & Reviews - 8% 42% 50% - 
It can be seen that some specific elements of the other two deep mines were seen to be “Resilient” 
by the groups undertaking the exercise. For example, 25% of the total responses across the sites put 
Element 3 (Risk and Change Management) and element 10 (Emergency Procedures) at this level. For 
Element 3, this was mainly down to the specific question set relating to “Work Site Job Safety 
Analysis” reflecting a well-established process at the mines to undertake task based risk assessments 
which would then be used to develop a method statement for the specific task. Although the hazards 
and control measures identified in these assessments were very generic, the mines had got into the 
process of regularly using these assessments or thinking about them before a task started. This was 
seen to be doing its job in reinforcing safety at the start of a specific routine task. 
In terms of Element 10 (Emergency planning) this score emphasizes the detailed plans in place for 
dealing with the realization of major mining hazards. At one mine, this plan had been successfully 
used in late 2010 to successfully evacuate all the workers from underground following a significant 
ignition of methane gas in one of their gate roads. 
By applying this type of process any areas of weakness across the company can be identified, and 
actions taken centrally to improve them. The individual sites can form plans to start improving their 
individual areas of weakness and, where there is overlap, work together. At Mine A improvement 
plans were produced by the Management Team after the initial study at to specifically improve 
elements 1, 2, 4 and 7 (all of which were in the “Planned” level) to bring them up to the mean of the  
12 elements (“Low Proactive”). A summary of this plan is shown in Table 5. 
The Journey Model has been used successfully to measure the current “baseline” as the new safety 
management standards are introduced. The intention is to run the exercise again across the surface and 
deep mine business with a view to informing the safety intervention strategy for the following year, 
both on site and as a Company, and to see whether there has been specific improvements from the 
initial study. In a drive to capture the broadest view and best inform the plan the exercise will continue 
be run with groups of Operational Managers, Supervisors and Site Operatives. The ultimate intention 
is to expand the use of this model, using it routinely for audit as well as developing it to measure 
individual business functions or even individuals within those functions. 
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Table 5. Action plan from Mine A. 
Standard/Element Required Changes Specific Actions As Measured by Responsibility 
1. Leadership & Accountability  
(1.3 Rewards of Good Safety  
Performance) 
Promote/celebrate significant 
safety achievements. 
Newsletter 
Screen in concourse. 
Accident free stats 
Specific Work Standards  
Achievements 
Safety Department 
Line Management 
HR Manager 
2. Policy & Commitment  
(2.1 Safety Accountability) 
Utilize front line supervisors 
to drive safety and “buy in” 
to safety. 
Managers Weekly  
Meeting with Officials 
Engineers weekly meeting
Safety Accountability  
meeting 
Observation 
Auditing 
Line Management 
2. Policy & Commitment  
(2.4 Status of the Safety Function) 
Clearer defined roles and  
responsibilities plus  
expectations within the  
mine management structure 
HQ/Colliery Manager  
consultation 
Align to UK Coal Safety 
Policy 
Compliance to Colliery  
Safety Action Plan 
HQ/Colliery Manager
4. Legal Requirements  
(4.1 Awareness of Legal  
Requirements) 
HQ Informing all line  
management in new/changes 
to legislation 
Email line managers  
bulletin with changes  
to legislation 
Refresher updates for line 
management (away  
from pit) 
Compliance to all legislation, 
company directives & codes  
& rules 
HQ/Colliery Manager
7. Communication & Consultation 
(1. Communications) 
Two way communication  
between management &  
workforce 
Face & Development start 
up meetings 
All other meetings 
Testing Knowledge 
Observations 
Line Management 
5. Conclusions 
The Maturity model concept has already, through the work of Hudson and Fleming, been shown to 
be a useful tool for organizations to establish their levels of safety culture maturity. The model here 
differs in that it is directly linked to a Company’s own safety management standards and any cultural 
elements have been defined within this. It has been successfully used by teams of Managers, 
Supervisors and Workers to look at the maturity of the safety management system at their sites. 
Likening the maturity to a “journey” also helps make the model more practical and friendlier to use. 
Whilst ultimately sites would like to move forward together on the journey, it does recognize that 
different sites will be at different places, and it is often important at the early stage of any improvement 
that any weaker areas be targeted first. 
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